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The Mass Age of Internet Law1 
Daithí Mac Síthigh2 
 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been 
published in Information & Communications Technology Law © 2008 Taylor & 
Francis; (2008) 17 I&CTL  79, available online at 
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1360-
0834&volume=17&issue=2&spage=79  
 
 
1. The Mass Age 
 
The popularity of ‘user-generated content’ represents the fulfilment of many 
optimistic predictions about ‘new media’.3  Videos made on a €100 digital 
camera can be uploaded to YouTube using relatively basic computer skills, with 
no prerequisites of media production training – or indeed any knowledge of 
media or Internet law.  Others use inexpensive software to edit and remix 
videos and songs, then upload them to the Web.  Blogging is a popular pursuit; 
setting up a blog requires little effort – and indeed, given that typical bloggers 
use a hosted service or a template on a self-hosted site, the gap between the 
look and feel of professional and amateur productions is significantly reduced in 
the case of blogging.  Wikipedia’s popularity continues to grow.  Podcasting is 
starting to take off, with BBC and backyard productions happily coexisting in the 
iTunes universe, and awareness of podcasts and podcasting continuing to 
grow.  Broadcasters and newspapers encourage their audiences to contribute 
their ‘own’ content to websites. 
 
The boom in the creation of what is recognised as new media (or something 
similar to media in form or in content) is an element in what I call the ‘mass age’ 
                                            
1
 The title for this piece is based on Marshall McLuhan’s exploration of the potential for puns on 
his own ‘medium is the message’; his 1967 book The Medium is the Massage included some 
use of the mass age / massage terms.  I also wish to acknowledge helpful discussions with Dr. 
Dan McQuillan and Rachel Cobcroft, feedback from audiences at the Society of Legal Scholars 
(SLS) and British & Irish Law, Education & Technology Association (BILETA), assistance from 
SLS cyberlaw convenor Prof. Steve Hedley, and advice from my doctoral supervisor Dr. Eoin 
O’Dell (none of whom bear any responsibility for what follows). 
2
 Lecturer in Law, Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia; PhD candidate, Trinity 
College Dublin. 
3
 This section relies on a range of general and statistical sources. On user engagement and 
participation, see the results of the SPIRE project at Oxford University: ‘Results and analysis of 
the Web 2.0 services survey undertaken by the SPIRE project’ (11 June 2007), 
http://spire.conted.ox.ac.uk/trac_images/spire/SPIRESurvey.pdf. On social networking and age-
related participation, see for example W Dutton and E Helsper, The Internet In Britain 2007 
(http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/oxis/OxIS2007_Report.pdf). On video, see Pew Internet & 
American Life Project, ‘Online Video’ (January 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/682/online-
video-audience-surges.  On podcasting, see the work of Edison Media Research, e.g. ‘The 
Podcast Audience Revealed’ (19 March 2007), 
http://www.edisonresearch.com/home/archives/2007/03/the_podcast_aud.php.  I found the 
following reports on new media and Web 2.0 helpful: UNESCO, New Media: The Press 
Freedom Dimension, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001520/152017e.pdf (February 
2007); OECD, ‘Participative Web: User-Created Content’ (DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7, 12 April 2007); 
H Green & C Gannon, ‘Their Space: Education for a Digital Generation’, 
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Their%20space%20-%20web.pdf. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271863
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of Internet law.  By this, I mean that the theories and questions developed in the 
earlier days of Internet law, such as jurisdiction, intermediary liability, debates 
over freedom of expression and so on are not only abstract or theoretical, but 
are issues that are likely to be relevant to the ‘average’ Internet user.  Of 
course, legal solutions to questions like who is liable for what is posted on 
Usenet or bulletin boards have been under consideration for some time.  
However, there is of course a social difference between systems developed in 
relation to a technology used by an extremely small minority of ‘early adopters’ 
and those used generally, and thus I highlight the current period of growth in 
‘user-generated content’ as being of particular interest.  When everyone (or a 
large section of users) is a producer, those subject to the diverse facets of 
Internet law are a correspondingly significant group of persons. 
 
The development of social networking sites (Myspace, Facebook, Bebo), 
blogging platforms (Blogger, Wordpress.com) and video sites (YouTube, 
DailyMotion, etc) means that uploading and sharing everything from personal 
data to self-created music, videos, thoughts, threats and bad poetry is relatively 
straightforward.4  The audiences for rich content are large; during 2007, the 
regular audience of online video sites in the US grew to around half of adults 
with regular Internet access.5  It is no surprise, too, that levels of participation 
(as compared with lurking) are increasing for the various new services making a 
greater number of people potential ‘producers’ or ‘creators’ rather than mere 
users or members of an audience. For example, a majority of Americans who 
shoot video now also post it online6 and of course, these sites typically show 
high levels of use and engagement. 
 
Far-reaching assertions about the importance and transformative nature of such 
sites are made by many.  For example, an OECD working paper reported that 
the ‘rise – or return – of the amateur’ may ‘result in lower entry barriers, 
distribution costs and user costs and greater diversity of works as digital shelf 
space is almost limitless.7   The engagement of youth is significant; British 
thinktank Demos noted that ‘Almost all [young people] are now also involved in 
creative production, from uploading and editing photos to building and 
maintaining websites’).8 
 
Although I focus on user-generated content in this paper, the mass age is also a 
reflection of other trends, such as the number of users of auction service eBay, 
the volume of online shopping transactions, and indeed the sheer number of 
Internet connections across the world.  It is appropriate, then, that our 
theoretical framework of cyberlaw continues to be elaborated in this mass age.  
Jonathan Zittrain calls on us to move on from domain names and network 
neutrality and to engage in a debate about the future of the network and of 
regulation in general.9  Indeed, it may be fair to say that the two solitudes of the 
cyberanarchists (or the cyberseparatists) against the cyberpaternalists - and the 
                                            
4
 ‘Participative Web’ (n 3).  
5
 ‘Online Video’ (n 3) 
6
 ‘Online Video’ (n 3). 
7
 OECD (n 3). 
8
 Green & Gannon (n 3). 
9
 J Zittrain, ‘The Generative Internet’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1997, 1978-9, 1996. 
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subsequent work of Lessig and others - give way as so much Internet law 
‘activity’ takes place.  The question, I believe, changes from ‘should the Internet 
be regulated?’ and ‘will the Internet be regulated?’ (the early debates), through 
‘how should the Internet be regulated?’ and ‘how will the Internet be regulated?’ 
(the Lessig discussions) to, in the current era, ‘how is the Internet being 
regulated?’10  In part 2, I review the current legal situation in terms of freedom of 
expression in particular; in part 3 I set out various ways in which legal or social 
responses are possible, and conclude with some general reflections on the 
regulation of new web services in part 4. 
 
2. From Mass Age To Massage 
 
While those who favour strong protection of freedom of expression can look at 
the history of the Internet (and indeed selected moments from the history of 
Internet law)11 and assume that the state of speech is strong, this state of affairs 
should not be taken for granted.  The technological features that (for reasons 
related to or unrelated to theories of free speech) appear to favour strong 
protection of speech rights do not mean that such advocates can sit back and 
reflect on their successes.  The architecture of the Internet, if changed, can 
have a different relationship with expression (as compared with historical and 
existing systems)12 and this, of course, means something in Internet law.  
Control of expression by governments remains possible, in particular through 
the control of gatekeepers such as credit card merchants, postal services and 
others.13  Conflicts between legal systems interest not just the student of private 
international law but also the publisher of potentially controversial or actionable 
content: the apocalyptic predictions at the time of the Gutnick case may not 
have come true,14 but neither is it prudent for publishers to ignore the lessons of 
Gutnick and other cases from the earlier period of Internet law. 
                                            
10
 Berman’s discussion of three generations of cyberlaw follows a similar structure: preface to 
Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).  Although he does not 
discuss it, I would add that Goldsmith and Wu (J Goldsmith & T Wu, Who controls the Internet? 
Illusions of a borderless world  (Oxford: OUP, 2006)) fit neatly into third-generation (or how-is) 
scholarship. 
11
 For example, ACLU v Reno (1997) 521 US 844, per Stevens J: ‘Thus, some of our cases 
have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not 
applicable to other speakers … Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor 
after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic fora of the Internet been subject to the 
type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry’ (868). 
12
 L Lessig, Code version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), ch 5. 
13
 Goldsmith & Wu (n 10) 
14
 Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56.  Publishers and media organisations intervened in the 
case and made the argument that finding for Gutnick (who alleged that an article on a US 
website could be considered in defamation proceedings in Australia) would make Internet 
publishing extremely difficult.  The judges dismissed this ‘spectre’ as ‘unreal’; in practice, the 
decision has not opened the floodgates for Internet defamation claims.  See J Reidenberg, 
‘Technology and Internet Jurisdiction’ (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1951 
(arguing that Gutnick and other cases represent the defence of legal systems against attack); N 
Garnett ‘Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick: Will Australia's Long Jurisdictional Reach Chill Internet 
Speech World-Wide?’ (2004) 13 Pacific Rim J of L & Policy (arguing that the impact is 
overstated); B Fitzgerald, ‘Dow Jones v Gutnick: Negotiating “American Legal Hegemony” in the 
Transnational World of Cyberspace’ [2003] Melbourne U L Rev 21 (arguing that the case shows 
divergence and diversity between national laws and should encourage accommodation rather 
than conflict); M Saadat, ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet after Gutnick and Yahoo!’ [2005] 1 J of 
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In this paper I am particularly interested in the practical role played by non-state 
actors (whether for commercial or legal reasons) in shaping Internet law as 
perceived by the user.  I argue that this represents the massage as well as the 
mass age of Internet law – the hands of the legal persons that are shaping and 
reshaping the law of the Internet through their own actions.15 This problem can 
be observed as one of particular significance in the context of new web 
applications, particularly those characterised as ‘social networking’ or ‘web 2.0’, 
where vast amounts of rich content, important data and interpersonal 
connections are facilitated by powerful hosts, household names like Facebook 
and YouTube. 
 
YouTube, purchased by Google for some $1.6bn, is one of the most popular 
websites in the world (at the time of writing).16  It is the subject of a series of 
high-profile lawsuits17 and thousands of newspaper articles (without even 
beginning to count blog posts that mention or link to the site).  YouTube is, of 
course, among the most significant hosts of user-generated content or amateur 
video content in the world, occupying significant user time and attention18 and 
although many competing sites exist, it cannot be doubted that for at least some 
significant proportion of ordinary users, YouTube is user-generated video 
(although, of course, not all of the content on YouTube is in fact user-generated; 
some of it is simply content ripped without editing from TV, DVDs etc). 
 
It could be argued, through looking at explicit State action alone, that videos 
posted on YouTube are not ‘regulated’.  There is no YouTube Act, and the 
videos are hosted in the speech-friendly US.  Existing Broadcasting Acts are 
unlikely to apply to YouTube uploaders or even to the site as a whole, due to 
technological definitions of broadcasting included in the statute or in caselaw.  
This, though, is a dated interpretation of regulation, and would be an incomplete 
assessment of YouTube.  Regulation of YouTube videos (and the producers of 
                                                                                                                                
Internet L & Tech, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/elj/jilt/2005_1/saadat/ (arguing that 
the case has not had the predicted impact on online expression). 
15
 Others have been addressing this question recently: see S Kreimer, ‘Censorship by Proxy: 
The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link’ (2006) 155 
U Penn L Rev 12; J Zittrain, ‘A History of Online Gatekeeping’ (2006) 19 Harvard J of L & Tech 
253; C Ahlert, C Marsden & C Yung, ‘How “Liberty” Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery 
Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-Regulation’ (2005, Report, Programme in Comparative 
Media Law and Policy, http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/text/liberty.pdf).  Detailed work on self-
regulation has been carried out by D Tambini, D Leonardi & C Marsden (eds), Codifying 
Cyberspace : communications self-regulation in the age of Internet convergence (London: 
Routledge, 2007).  A particularly amusing treatment of the speech-related issues, focused on 
IP, is included in K McLeod, Freedom Of Expression: Resistance and Repression in the Age of 
Intellectual Property (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007) 
16
 Website ranking is notoriously difficult.  Alexa.com ranks YouTube as the ‘fourth most 
popular’ and estimates a daily reach of approximately 14% of the Internet audience.  In the UK, 
where the use of video websites increased by 178% in the last year alone, YouTube is the most 
popular video site and the eight most popular overall (hitwise.com). 
17
 A blog that covers YouTube and similar sites lists a range of active suits (including class 
actions) against YouTube including the high-profile Viacom case (Viacom v YouTube, 07-CV-
01203, Southern District NY): http://www.theutubeblog.com. 
18
 For example, the ‘Attention’ matrix compiled by Compete points to the high amount of time 
spent by users on video and social networking websites: 
http://blog.compete.com/2007/07/11/compete-attention-200-june/; see also Spire (n 3). 
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these videos) takes place every day – through the application of general law (in 
particular copyright law)19 and through the terms of use of the site: 
 
YouTube reserves the right to decide whether Content or a User 
Submission is appropriate and complies with these Terms of Service for 
violations other than copyright infringement and violations of intellectual 
property law, such as, but not limited to, pornography, obscene or 
defamatory material, or excessive length. YouTube may remove such 
User Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading such 
material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without prior 
notice and at its sole discretion.20 
 
Sometimes, of course, the private regulator (which continues, through its public 
policy advocacy, to express opposition to ‘regulation’)21 goes too far, and an 
outcry forces a reversal.  Indeed, some situations seem to be perfect 
illustrations of the problem; take for example the controversial removal (on 
multiple occasions, on grounds of copyright law) of a video that contained 
information on an allegedly overreaching copyright claim by the National 
Football League (NFL), posted on YouTube by law professor (and former 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) attorney) Wendy Seltzer.22  In other 
situations, the outcry (from ‘the public’ or from state authorities) is directed 
towards Google and YouTube, resulting in a takedown of material on the global 
site based on objections in non-US jurisdictions, as in the case of recent pro-
Nazi materials.23 
 
A major source of embarrassment for various parties asserting copyright 
violations (and indeed for YouTube) are the proceedings brought by the EFF in 
relation to apparently erroneous takedown notices related to the Viacom 
litigation and other matter.24  In this regard, the promised development of 
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 See discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), below. 
20
 http://www.youtube.com/t/terms, section 7B. 
21
 ‘If we need to, we will step up our advocacy efforts to make sure that politicians and 
regulators don't impose unnecessary regulations which would stifle the fantastic growth of user-
generated content.’  P Moll, ‘European content regulation and the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive’ (Google Public Policy Blog, 16 July 2007), http://googlepublicpolicy. 
blogspot.com/2007/07/european-content-regulation-and.html.  The author is Google’s European 
Policy Manager. 
22
 A summary of events is posted on Seltzer’s blog: ‘NFL: Second Down and Goal?’ 5 April 
2007, http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/archives/2007/04/05/nfl_second_down_and_goal.html. 
23
 P Donahue, ‘Google Plans to Remove Nazi Hate Videos on YouTube in Germany’ 
(Bloomberg News 28 August 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601100&sid=aZt3njiVsNqo.  Despite the headline, the removal relates to the general, 
global YouTube site.  The YouTube terms of service still assert that ‘i) the YouTube Website 
shall be deemed solely based in California; and (ii) the YouTube Website shall be deemed a 
passive website that does not give rise to personal jurisdiction over YouTube, either specific or 
general, in jurisdictions other than California.’  (The term ‘passive website that does not give rise 
to personal jurisdiction’ is a clear echo of the Zippo test (Zippo Manufacturing v Zippo.com 
(1997) 952 F Supp 1119 (Western District PA)). 
24
 For example, Saipent v Geller (http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/sapient_v_geller/), the ‘Electric 
Slide’ litigation (http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/electricslide/) Diehl v Crook 
(http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/diehl_v_crook/) and a suit against Viacom in relation to an error 
in a large set of takedown notices (http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/005213.php).  All of 
these matters have been settled with apologies or are still in progress. 
6  
automatic copyright violation-detecting technologies is cause for concern.25  
Aside from familiar concerns about the automation of legal systems, the fact 
that the most important factor that seems to come into play for controlling 
access to user-generated video content is not legislation or regulations but 
YouTube’s policies service at least indicates that the current measure of 
‘control’ may be in private, unaccountable hands (which some believe to be 
trigger-happy) and should be challenged, rather than reinforced through 
automated processes. 
 
The role of legislation (and legal culture) in bringing about this situation cannot 
be ignored, though.  For example, the notice-and-takedown requirements of 
section 512 of the (US) Copyright Act (popularly the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act ‘safe harbor’ provisions), which grants some liability to the online 
service provider against copyright claims if they follow certain conditions 
(including disabling access to the allegedly infringing material, on receipt of 
proper notice from the rights owner, and communicating with the user who 
uploaded it (but not necessarily before disabling access)), with a more difficult 
system for users to apply to have the material reinstated,26 clearly favours and 
encourages the ‘delete now, ask questions later’ approach taken by YouTube 
and other Web 2.0 hosts.  On the other hand, the requirements of section 230 
of the Telecommunications Act (inserted as part of the Communications 
Decency Act and passed as part of the 1996 telecommunications law reform) 
are less onerous27 - although many providers remain unwilling or unable to use 
section 230 or similar provisions.28  The value of section 230 has been debated 
at length29 and continues to lead to interesting cases,30 but of course it remains 
silent on the rights of non-intermediaries.31 
 
The focus of new legislation and international agreements on the enhancement 
of the protection of intellectual property (rather than on user rights) and the 
creeping reduction in what is considered as fair use or fair dealing (with the 
honourable exception of the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH Canadian v Law 
                                            
25
 See for example the comments of Google attorney Philip Beck, reported in C Metz, ‘YouTube 
video-fingerprinting due in September’ (The Register 30 July 2007), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/30/youtube_video_fingerprinting_due_in_fall/. 
26
 US Code, Title 17 Chapter 5, §512c. 
27
 US Code, Title 47, Chapter 5(II), §230c.  This section does not apply to federal criminal law 
and intellectual property law.   
28
 Hedley argues (at 154) that many providers show ‘timidity’ in dealing with legal threats: S 
Hedley, The law of electronic commerce in the UK and Ireland (London: Cavendish, 2005). 
29
 K Myers, ‘Wikimmunity: Fitting The Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia’ 20 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 163 (arguing that Wikipedia should not be protected by section 
230); Holland, ‘In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of 
Modified Exceptionalism’ (2007) 56 Kansas L Rev 101 (paying tribute to the role of section 230 
thus far); M Lemley, ‘Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors’ (SSRN), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979836 (favouring some reform of the provision). 
30
 Most recently, in Fair Housing Council v Roommate.com, the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeal (3rd April 2008) found that certain aspects of a website providing accommodating listings 
could not be the subject of litigation (under equality law) while others could. 
31
 Even after the decision in Barrett v Rosenthal (2006 WL 3346218 (SC Ca., 20 November 
2006)) (a user can rely on section 230 with regard to republishing the words of others), the 
‘rights’ of a user as expressed against their hosts are not protected, in terms of their own 
expression – and section 230 enables intermediaries to censor user speech without review 
while freed from the threat of editorial or publisher liability. 
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Society32 and SOCAN v CAIP33) hardly encourages sensible corporations to 
take a hands-off approach.  The deception is thus complete: the legislators can 
swear that they are not regulating ‘the Internet’, merely modernising and 
deepening important (and pro-business?) intellectual property laws, while 
YouTube and similar enterprises, as long as they continue to follow the 
instructions set down in copyright and other general legislation, can regulate 
away without the need to deal with conventional democratic structures or 
engage in freedom of expression analysis (or even the balancing aspects – or 
what remains of them – of intellectual property law).  The problem is that 
copyright law and even other statutory regimes such as data protection34 and 
private terms of service are sources of regulation that affect the producer of 
user-generated content and thus their ability to participate in public debate and 
to exercise freedom of expression. 
 
In that context, a particular point of concern is the restriction of political speech 
on social networks favoured by younger users.  Allegations have been made 
against Myspace,35 Bebo,36 Flickr37 and Facebook38.  Publishers like AT&T (in 
                                            
32
 [2004] SCC 13 (holding that certain activities of the Law Society’s library did not infringe 
Canadian copyright law, giving a broad interpretation to the fair dealing provisions of the 
Copyright Act) 
33
 [2004] SCC 45 (holding in favour of ISPs in proceedings over liability for the download of 
music by users, caching by ISPs and other matters). 
34
 A recent example is the threatened use of the Data Protection Act to secure the removal of a 
‘hidden camera’ video published as part of a dispute between a client and social workers.  ‘No 
data protection exemption for YouTube baby battle video’ (The Register 22 August 2007), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/08/22/baby_battle_dpa_exemption/.  It is believed that the 
arguments are based on the Lindqvist case ([2003] ECR I-12971), which allowed data 
protection law to be applied to the posting of (what could be described as trivial) personal data 
on the Internet. 
35
 See for example a summary of the arguments between liberal advocacy group Moveon.org 
and MySpace: ‘MoveOn Openly Battling MySpace Censorship’ (18 May 2007), 
http://mashable.com/2007/05/18/moveon-myspace/; J Bosman, ‘Lesson for Murdoch: Keep the 
Bloggers Happy’ (New York Times 2 January 2006)); C Harold, Ourspace : resisting the 
corporate control of culture (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2007) xv; See e.g. B Pesta, 
‘MySpace: No place for Atheists?’, http://www.secularstudents.org/node/1933, ‘MySpace Atheist 
and Agnostic Group Restored (sort of)’, http://www.secularstudents.org/node/1942, ‘Banned: 
MySpace deletes world's largest atheist group’, 
http://blog.newhumanist.org.uk/2008/01/banned-myspace-deletes-largest-atheist.html 
36
 See for example the discussion by Gareth Stack and Simon McGarr: G Stack, ‘Bebogate?’ 
(15 March 2007), http://www.dbspin.com/social-networks/bebogate/ and ‘Webcamp – social 
networks’ (10 March 2007), http://www.dbspin.com/web/webcamp-social-networks/.  A range of 
Irish political campaigns, including the left-wing Killer Coke activist network and republican 
political party Sinn Féin’s youth wing, have alleged that Bebo has censored/deleted user 
profiles. 
37
 ‘Yahoo “censored” Flickr comments’ (BBC News 18 May 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6665723.stm (deletion of critical comments); J Libbenga, 
‘German Flickr censorship causes web outcry’ (The Register 18 June 2007), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/18/outcry_against_flickr_censorship/ (State-based 
filtering). 
38
 L Beyerstein, ‘Facebook Bans Union Organizer for Making Too Many Friends’ (Alternet 24 
January 2008), http://www.alternet.org/blogs/peek/74855/ and T Connell, ‘Banned Union 
Organizer Back on Facebook’ (AFL-CIO Blog 25 January 2008), 
http://blog.aflcio.org/2008/01/25/banned-union-organizer-back-on-facebook/ (trade union 
organisation); ‘Tech Notebook’ (San Jose Mercury News 23 February 2008), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_8344164 (political campaigning); J Pena-Bickley, ‘My 
Facebook Fiasco’ (ON: Digital + Marketing 13 February 2008), 
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its capacity a a host/sponsor rather than ISP) routinely censor political 
comments39.  Systems of censorship in jurisdictions with restrictive policies on 
political expression have begun to target social networking and web 2.0 site 
hosts on a regular basis.40  Calls have been made for further analysis of the 
various Web 2.0 services, including Dan McQuillan’s persuasive argument for 
treating site polices on freedom of expression like privacy policies, exposing 
them to similar scrutiny and analysis.41  A detailed guide on how to respond 
‘when Facebook censors your political speech’ is available42 and some users 
have tried to list the (apparently arbitrary) reasons why accounts can be 
disabled.43  Indeed, the power of a service provider to close an account is a 
particularly important one.44 
 
Of course, there is no obligation on anyone to set up a Myspace or Bebo profile.  
However, going beyond the formal legal position, and drawing on the tradition of 
public forum analysis in US law, it is clear that, especially within schools, social 
groups and personal relationships, these sites are of particular importance in 
the production of culture and meaning.  A situation where the political 
expression (of young speakers or others) is subject to the veto of 
unaccountable site owners  (in the sense that they lack transparent, public, 
legal mechanisms for the review of their actions) is a real challenge to the more 
idealistic visions of new forms of media and the consequence of such for 
freedom of expression.45  These hosts sometimes show little hesitation in 
controlling expression, including high-value political expression, relying upon 
their privileged position as private publishers while making public assertions 
about communication and connecting communities. Indeed, the general point 
that citizens have increasingly few opportunities to engage with each other 
through what in the US are (for legal purposes) traditional public forums46, to 
this author, adds to the relevance of political expression (and the enormity of 
censorship) on ‘youth’-targeted social networking sites. 
                                                                                                                                
http://joannapenabickley.typepad.com/on/2008/02/on-my-facebook.html (unobjectionable 
political content deleted after misuse of ‘report post’ function). 
39
 G Kaufman, ‘AT&T Admits It Edited Webcasts Before Pearl Jam's’ (MTV News 13 August 
2007), http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1566946/20070813/pearl_jam.jhtml. 
40
 Significant work on this topic has been carried out by Ethan Zuckerman: see for example R 
Singel, ‘Seeking Tighter Censorship, Repressive States Target Web 2.0 Apps’ (Wired Blogs : 
Epicenter 4 March 2008) http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/03/etech-what-happ.html 
41
 D McQuillan, ‘We need a freedom of expression league table for Web 2.0’ (July 2007), 
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Our faith in new media and our belief in the value of user-generated content has 
the potential to upset the balance between freedom and control, as the ability of 
the stronger parties (what I call the ‘New Gatekeepers’) to massage Internet law 
is enhanced (through a blend of law, technology and culture) in a way that can 
go beyond normal consumer relations, given both the enhanced engagement of 
the end user (as a producer rather than passive recipient) and the hostility of 
Internet industries to any form of legal protection for users. 
 
3. The Mess Age: How The Crowd Can Get Wise 
 
a. User Indiggnation (Or, 09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63-56-88-
c0)47 
 
Protecting the encryption of DVDs has bothered manufacturers for some time.  
Cracking said encryption is one of the favourite pastimes of certain 
programmers.  It was inevitable, then, that the string above, which is used in 
encryption of the HD-DVD format, would be published and distributed.  Among 
the reasons for its fame, though, is the ‘user revolt’ that it provoked on ‘user-
submitted’ news site digg.com. 
 
Digg users submitted posts about the string, after a range of sites had received 
takedown notices from the industry consortium responsible for the format.  
These posts were quickly deleted by editors.  They tried again and, through the 
ranking systems of the site, the profile of the stories and the string increased.  
The stories were deleted again.  More stories appeared.  More deletions 
happened (while, in the meantime, similar issues were cropping up on other 
sites, and the string was being reproduced on everything from Wikipedia pages 
to t-shirts).  The saga came to an end with a dramatic post by editor and 
founder Kevin Rose, the title of which was ‘Digg This’ followed by the full 
string.48  In this post, Rose acceded to the will of the community and allowed 
the posting of the string to continue; ‘If we lose, then what the hell, at least we 
died trying’.49 
 
On communities and control, Murray referred to the infamous sales of Live 8 
tickets on eBay.50  The sale of these limited, free tickets on the site sparked 
some anger within the ‘eBay community’, with a mixture of tactics being 
employed.  These tactics included direct action (false bidding, disruption, etc by 
a small group of activists) and more conventional expressions of dissent (such 
as complaints on message boards) taken by a wider group of users).  eBay 
backed down and adopted a new policy of forbidding the sale of these particular 
tickets.  Murray argues, though, that the eBay decision was due to the actions 
of the broad eBay community (and not concert organiser Bob Geldof, the media 
or even those who engaged in direct action) – perhaps a difficult assertion to 
                                            
47
 C Jeffrey, ‘In Digg Nation’, Mother Jones (July/August 2007), 
http://www.motherjones.com/interview/2007/07/kevin_rose.html 
48
 K Rose, ‘Digg This: 09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63-56-88-c0’ (1 May 2007), 
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prove, as assigning motives to the decision of a company is far from an exact 
art (even when the official reason is ‘community’ pressure) but is indeed a 
strong argument against accepting that the New Gatekeepers have total 
freedom of action. 
 
Of course, a collection of letters and numbers of interest to an engineer or a 
listing of concert tickets may not be typical examples of user-generated content, 
but they do illustrate one model of relationship between the user community and 
site editors in a Web 2.0 environment, and in particular the danger (to IP 
owners) of taking on ‘the community’.  These ‘Spartacus moments’51 are not 
uncommon on the Internet.  They add to John Gilmour’s famous observation 
(that the Internet treats censorship as damage and routes around it)52 a gloss 
that the Internet community (or, more realistically, a subculture of Internet 
users) treats censorship as a threat and routes around it through reproducing 
the threatened content many times. 
 
In the case of media, copyright and censorship, the interaction between the 
actions of gatekeepers and the response of the community continues to be an 
important one, as law firm Nixon Peabody found out to their cost recently.53  
Clearly these actions draw upon both the culture of early Internet users54 and 
consumer pressure campaigns more generally.  Furthermore, in many of the 
allegations of censorship summarised in this paper, users participated in 
electronic civil disobedience or lobbying against decisions perceived to be 
arbitrary or unfair. 
 
It can be noted, though, that this may have limitations as a tactic, particularly in 
an environment where the number of persons connected continues to rise and 
the number of interactions between those who exercise powers of control and 
the user rises too.  For the amateur creator, unversed in Internet subcultures, 
the protection of angry Diggers may offer little consolation.  Indeed, a 
particularly negative interpretation is that the culture of protecting free speech 
itself may itself be modified or softened through the influence of new users. 
 
b. Legal balancing 
 
Existing laws, particularly those related to consumer protection, may assist the 
new generation of users.  For example, the Computer and Communications 
Industry Association (CCIA) has brought an application before the Federal 
Trade Commission in the US to challenge some of the what they see as the 
more egregious examples of abuse of intellectual property power, citing the 
NFL, Major League Baseball, Penguin Books and others as engaging in illegal 
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behaviour (deceptive trade practices and unfair trade practices) through 
copyright warnings that allegedly misrepresent the state of the law and in 
particular user rights such as fair use.55  Law professors Ariel Katz and Michael 
Geist have wondered whether similar action should be taken against Canadian 
licensing agency Access Copyright.56 
 
In some areas of intellectual property law, the making of ‘groundless threats’ 
can be grounds for further legal action.57  For example, certain regulations 
(indigenous and transposing) in the UK relating to designs, trademarks and 
patents provide for remedies.58  Bainbridge has highlighted the inconsistency in 
certain abusive practices being subject to straightforward punishment and 
others not being so treated, even though some areas such as copyright (where 
no such remedy exists)59 are experiencing more instances of groundless threats 
than those covered under existing legislation. 
 
Of course, it is accepted that normal competition law remedies may be available 
to constrain IP abuses.  It must be noted, though, that if the restraint of 
groundless threats or overzealous enforcement were a serious demand, it 
would join a long list of ‘user rights’ demands (such as ceasing the ceaseless 
extension of copyright terms, allowing the unlocking of digital rights 
management (DRM), protecting parody, defending time-shifting and space-
shifting, etc), and thus may be an unrealistic proposal in political terms. 
 
Furthermore, concerns over standard-form contracts and electronic transactions 
have come to the forefront in a number of recent cases, such as Dell v Union 
des Consommateurs60 (Canada) and Shroyer v New Cingular & AT&T61 (US).  
End-user licence agreements (EULAs) have been studied and criticised by 
consumer authorities.62  In the context of the discussion of contract law, these 
certainly contribute to a debate about power and control in the electronic era; 
however, contract law may not resolve all these problems, as its tools are not 
necessarily appropriate or geared towards questions of speech and culture. 
 
Although not appearing in the text of the treaties, the doctrine of ‘essential 
facilities’ (usually discussed in the context of Article 86) is an important one 
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within EU competition law.63  Of initial relevance in transport (where ferry 
operators were using their ownership of ports in a way that disadvantaged rival 
operators) and then in telecommunications, it has already been recognised that 
‘convergence creates bottlenecks with a highly strategic commercial value’64.  
Historically, similar principles have been applied to newswires in the US,65 were 
considered in an European Court of Justice case regarding newspaper 
distribution,66 and in the Internet and new media areas, EU legislation on 
conditional access (for pay television) and interconnection (for networking) have 
seen the application of essential facilities arguments.67  Could these ideas be of 
use in the area of user-generated content, preventing site operators from 
squeezing out others?68  However, the intellectual link between the essential 
facilities doctrine and economic monopolisation is difficult to break, and the 
precedents at EU level have related to more things that are arguably more 
important (in the context of the European Union’s role in economic integration) 
than the right to post about politics on a Bebo page. 
 
c. Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
Can we rely on the important players, then, to use their power over users in a 
responsible fashion?  Corporate social responsibility is an idea that is easy to 
grasp: that corporate legal persons have a duty to act in a way that is 
sustainable, or respectful of human rights, or sensitive to race and gender, or to 
take other actions that go beyond the normal requirements of commercial 
practice.  In a world where the publication of user-generated content depends 
so much on the facilities provided by private companies (in the same way that 
corporations wield influence in other areas), is it not useful for those concerned 
about the future of user-generated content to look to companies and their 
corporate social responsibility policies for solutions? 
 
Although initial suggestions have been made about corporate social 
responsibility and Internet filtering (i.e. the more overt censorship practiced in 
certain countries), this remains a relatively underdiscussed area.  A very useful 
taxonomy of those companies that might face requests or orders to engage in 
filtering shows that effectively all aspects of the Internet industry are potentially 
implicated in international censorship and that understanding the ethical 
dilemmas is thus of some importance.69  Given the infamous decision by 
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Google to back down on its no-filtering promise in order to gain access to the 
Chinese market, it is understandable that an advocate of free expression might 
doubt the bona fides of the seemingly friendly New Gatekeepers, 
headquartered in Silicon Valley rather than Wall Street.  The rejection of 
moderate proposals on freedom of expression proposed by pension funds at 
the Google and Yahoo AGMs70 (such rejection being recommend by the boards 
of the respective corporations) only adds to this scepticism.  Furthermore, the 
arguments that support corporate social responsibility in the traditional 
regulated media and communications industries may not be as apparent in 
Internet industries.71 MacKinnon’s analysis of corporate social responsibility and 
US companies operating in China identifies the difficulties presented by the 
requirement to comply with domestic law and how it differs from US or 
international law in a particular area, and the role that users can play in 
demanding full disclosure and honesty from Web industries above and beyond 
mere compliance with the law.72  However, while corporate social responsibility 
remains controversial and not fully tested, this approach – perhaps fused with 
the consumer-activist approach discussed above – may act as a check on 
complete freedom for corporate owners. 
 
d. Self-regulation? 
 
Methods of co-regulation and self-regulation have proliferated in recent years, 
as have co-regulatory strategies (regulation by an industry with the approval of 
legal authorities) and optional schemes run by public authorities.  The US state 
of Utah is considering a voluntary ‘seal of approval’ system for ISPs.73  In the 
UK, the Broadband Strategy Group (a joint Government-industry group) has 
established what it calls Audiovisual Content Information Good Practice 
Principles74 agreed by many UK media producers (traditional broadcasters with 
online elements such as Channel 4, intermediaries such as mobile phone 
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networks and hosts such as Bebo).   Voluntary systems in the EU include ‘DNS 
blacklisting’ (or poisoning), filtering and more;75 none are (as yet) backed by 
legislation and the requirements of the Electronic Commerce Directive are 
unclear in this regard.  In some cases, national governments have played a 
significant role in the drafting of such codes, even writing the first draft in the 
case of Italy.76 
 
However, does an over-emphasis on non-interventionist techniques enable 
intermediaries to possess unintentionally significant power in violation of the 
communicative rights of individual users?  They are perceived as efficient in the 
context of Internet regulation,77 although certainly, some scepticism has been 
expressed regarding the impact of self-regulation on freedom of expression.  In 
particular, the concern of ‘the privatisation of censorship’ is a common one, with 
particular emphasis being placed on the lack of accountability mechanisms.78  
The EU, though, is a vigorous promoter of self-regulation and co-regulation in 
the context of media law.79  The Council of Europe has also showed some 
interest in this topic, in its ‘Recommendation on freedom of expression in the 
online world’ which relies in part on the proposal of self-regulatory solutions.  
EDRI, the network of digital rights NGOs in Europe, has launched a campaign 
against this Recommendation, arguing that the document ‘promot(es) opaque 
"self-regulation" and other soft law instruments driven by private interests and 
implemented through technical mechanisms.’ 80  Justification for this concern 
can be seen from the record of the first major example of online co-regulation, 
dispute resolution for domain names, where systematic unfairness has been 
identified by both Mueller81 and Geist82 in separate research projects.  Legal 
control remains unclear and differs greatly even within the common-law world, 
changing rapidly in the light of the Human Rights Act in the UK.83 
 
4. The Message 
 
‘The modern Internet is at a point of inflection.’84 
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Jonathan Zittrain argues that the ‘generativity’ of the grid made up of the 
Internet and the various computers connected to it is threatened not just by 
malign actions (virus writers, spam, etc) but also by the systems develop to 
meet security and safety concerns (‘tethered’ appliances and locked-down 
applications).85  It is an unavoidable starting point for any general consideration 
of future Internet regulation.  How do we heed his call to consider change, 
though?  Is ‘regulation’ necessary after all? 
 
Even traditional rights-based protections of free expression such as the First 
Amendment itself can be seen as a form of legal regulation of speech, in that it 
forms part of the law that affects how speech is treated by the (US) state, 
constrains the actions of state actors where speech is concerned and 
contributes to the formation of a particular legal culture.  More controversially, 
the idea of a right of access to media,86 opposition to the ‘monopolisation of 
knowledge’87 and of substantive ‘freedom of communication’88 are potentially 
useful.  Moving the debate from the sterile territory of regulation vs no regulation 
to an honest consideration of the value of freedom of expression in the context 
of other laws and rights may be most helpful, particularly in a context where 
new media actors are brought within the scope of existing laws that favour news 
reporting or cultural expression (such as the protection of sources and fair use 
for the purposes of parody). 
 
The publication of user-generated content is increasingly seen as part of a 
market.  Naturally, arguments over competition and free enterprise can be 
significant in any discussion of how to control the massage of Internet law.  
Even for those that rejoice in unregulated markets, though, the success of the 
European Union in opening up competitive markets in telecommunications can 
be recognised as a successful approach – that involved both regulation and the 
enhancement of competition – with arguably beneficial consequences for 
expression and culture, most notably through a diversification and 
fragmentation of gatekeepers, thus lessening the power of older monopolies 
(state and private).  Furthermore, the EU approach is constrained by the 
commitment to the protection of cultural diversity contained within the 
institution’s treaties89 and the application of cultural considerations within 
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competition or other aspects of European law is continuing to be an important 
issue for media and communications, particularly in the light of the UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity which entered into force in March 2007.90 
 
Taking all these points together, my conclusion is that the consideration of the 
massage of Internet law cannot go forward without addressing the problem of 
the private gatekeeper.  The New Gatekeepers wield huge control, both in 
theory and in practice.  Indeed, I would go so far as to say that they can stifle 
generativity, and may act as a force towards culture and expression in a way 
that tethered appliances do towards the generative ‘grid’.  In this, I differ from 
Andrew Keen, who argues in a recent book that the universe of user-generated 
content is ‘destroying our culture’.91  While he expresses some valid points 
about the social role played by editors and broadcasters in the past, I assert 
that it is in fact possible to welcome the diversity of new media without 
accepting without question the role of the New Gatekeepers in new media law. 
 
Media law itself, dealing as it does with things like public service broadcasting 
and the fair use of public resources, has a nuanced and well-developed concept 
of culture that remains useful in an era of ‘Internet law’.  While much of the 
media law approach may be a result of necessity rather than altruism (resulting 
from factors such as spectrum scarcity), it is necessary, I believe, to question 
reports of ‘new media’ taking the place of old by asking whether the regulatory 
systems that control new media (and in particular the role of those who control 
access to distribution systems in such system) are similarly sensitive to cultural 
diversity and freedom of expression.  I have argued in this paper that the 
potential for cultural monopolisation through the use of control points should at 
least cause us to consider whether aspects of new media applications may 
facilitate the restriction of freedom of expression in certain circumstances. 
 
The true lesson of discussions of power and censorship in ‘Web 2.0’ is that 
whatever solutions are developed must be relevant to the ‘average’ user.  
Traditional media regulations can be focused on a small number of producers, 
and early Internet law on the minority of persons engaged in Internet 
transactions and interactions, but the modern Internet media environment 
includes a range of users and creators - predominantly young and perhaps 
outside the traditional understandings of Internet users as in the case of Usenet 
or early role-playing games.  The model, maybe, should be a mixture of 
moderately protectionist consumer law (commonplace in even the most 
capitalist and liberalised of economies), which is sensitive to human rights 
issues, and community-driven solutions – but relying on neither in isolation. 
 
When Internet regulation is equated with a particular issue of controversy 
(whether domain names or terrorism), or indeed when dealt with in total 
isolation from all preceeding legal and political debates, cyberlaw may seem 
bizarrely detached from reality.  On the contrary, I believe that the everyday 
issues of cyberlaw (and new legislation in particular) can serve to illustrate 
rather than negate questions like: can corporations guarantee free speech?; 
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what is the relationship between access to media and freedom of expression; 
what are the cultural consequences of corporate policies?  In our consideration 
of legal issues, we are often open to influences from Internet scholars, in talking 
of things like networks and code; to critical media studies, perhaps less so.92  
The massage of Internet law is by no means a foregone conclusion but in 
considering regulatory options, being aware of such dangers can surely, to 
borrow the words of Google, ‘do no harm’. 
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